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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
Lis PENDENS OPERATES AS TO UNKNOWN OWNERS
FILED OR WHEN AFFIDAVITS REQUISITE TO PUBLICATION ARE FED.---A relaxation in the strict construction
WHETHER

WHEN BILL Is

heretofore believed necessary in the application of section 7 of
the Illinois Chancery Act,' which, with section 12, has the effect
of concluding rights of unknown defendants, often without actual knowledge on their part that such rights are in litigation,
Court
is indicated by the recent decision of the Illinois Supreme
2
in the case of Alexander Lumber Co. v. Kellerman.
3
The Lumber Company filed a bill under the Liens Act to fore1 L. 1871-2, p. 329, sec. 7 as amended by L. 1933, p. 193; Cahill's Ill. Rev.
Stat. (1933), Ch. 22, par. 7.
2 358 Ill. 207 (1934).
3 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 82.

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

close a lien for material furnished the owners of a lot, for construction of a dwelling. The last material was delivered on
October 20, 1928. In the bill and summons, filed September 20,
1930, the unknown owners of a mortgage note were named as
parties defendant. Return of the summons, filed October 6,
1930, recited that the unknown defendants were not found in the
county. On December 3, 1930, the affidavit of unknown owners
and holders required by section 7 of the Chancery Act, and the
affidavit of non-residence required by section 12, were filed. Publication was on December 5, 1930.
On August 14, 1931, one Metcoff, who had acquired the note
from the original holder in July, 1931, filed an intervening petition. The petition alleged that the intervener became owner of
the note without knowledge of the pendency of the suit and that
inasmuch as the action was not begun as to him within the two
years after delivery of the last material, as required by the Liens
Act, the rights of the Lumber Company were subordinate to his.
In support of his allegations, the petitioner contended that because the summons was issued prior to the affidavit as to unknown owners-required by section 7 of the Chancery Act-the
service by publication was void as to the then holders of the
note; that because the affidavit was not filed within two years
after delivery of the last material, suit was not commenced as
to such unknown owners within the statutory period; therefore
he took the note free of lis pendens.
The filing of the bill was held to constitute commencement of
the suit as to the unknown parties, even though the affidavit as
to such unknown parties was not filed until almost three months
later, and having taken the note lis pendens, the rights of the
intervener were subordinate to those of the lien holder.
The court admits the authority of the cases 4 decided prior to
the passage of the Lis Pendens Act 5 in 1917, to the effect that
lis pendens did not begin until service was had, but finds in this
act, as construed in Moore v. Zelic, 6 authority for holding that
suit wds commenced as to the unknown owners and holders upon
the filing of the bill. This is predicated on the provision of the
Lis Pendens Act, which makes a suit in chancery constructive
notice tb one who subsequently acquires an interest in the res,
from the time the bill is filed.
Some comment on the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Shaw
may be interesting. The dissent is predicated upon the fact that
the only provision of law which authorizes the making of an
4 Gage v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 303 Ill. 569, 136 N. E. 483 (1922);
Grant v. Bennett, 96 Ill. 513 (1880) ; Dime Savings & Trust Co. v. Knapp, 313
Ill. 377, 145 N. E. 235 (1924) ; Wenner v. Thornton, 98 Ill. 156 (1881).
5 L. 1917, p. 1; Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 22, par. 57.
6338 III. 583, 170 N. E. 604 (1930).
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unknown owner a party to this suit is section 7 of the Chancery
Act, which, in the opinion of the dissenting justice, requires the
affidavit of unknown owners as a condition upon which they
may be brought in. If this is true, it would appear that they are
not, and cannot, be made parties until the affidavit is filed. If
none is filed, they are never .parties. From this reasoning, according to the dissenting opinion, they are not in the case until
the affidavit is filed, which upon the record in the principal case
was after the period of limitation had run.
This view appears to be sustained by the cases cited in the
dissenting opinion, Dime Savings and Trust Co. v. Knapp,7 and
Wenner v. Thornton,8 unless the value of these authorities has
been impaired by the Lis Pendens Act and Moore v. Zelic. It
may be doubted whether Moore v. Zelic is in point, under the
facts and circumstances of the principal case. In the Zelic case,
no unknown defendant was involved. Undoubtedly, the filing
of the complaint, where the defendants are all named, is the
commencement of the suit; but where there are defendants in
such complaint who are not named, but merely designated as
unknown persons, does this constitute as to them, the filing of a
complaint, or is something more required ?
The Chancery Act requires the filing of two affidavits. Under
section 7, an affidavit must be filed by the party desiring to
make any unknown person a party. Under section 12, another
affidavit must be filed to warrant service on such unknown defendants by publication. At common law, an unknown person
could not be made defendant in an action. It is only by statutory
authority that suit can be commenced against him at all. Since
it is in derogation of common law, such a statute must be strictly
construed, and all its provisions must be strictly complied with.
It might be said, therefore, that without the affidavit required
by section 7, a complaint which merely designates an alleged
defendant as an unknown party is not, as to such defendant, a
complaint at all, and therefore not the commencement of the
action.
This point of view finds support in the fact-pointed out in
the authorities prior to the Lis Pendens Act and the decision in
Moore v. Zelic and cited in the dissenting opinion-that two
affidavits are required. The affidavit required by section 7 is
not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction on service by publication, but the additional affidavit required by section 12 must also
be filed. The affidavit of section 7 must be given some effect-and
its only effect would appear to be that of authorizing the action
against the unknown defendant.
7313 Ill. 377, 145 N. E. 235 (1924).
898 Ill.
156 (1881).
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Where the defendant is named in the complaint, the complaint is complete without an affidavit, for such complaint enables
the court, without more, to issue its process and thus acquire
jurisdiction. But where the defendant is simply designated as
an unknown person, it might be said that there is no complaint
at all until the affidavit of section 7 is filed, for the court is not
yet in position to issue process. When the affidavit of section 7
is filed, process may issue, after which the affidavit of section 12
authorizes its service by publication.
From this, it might be reasoned that the Lis Pendens Act
does not apply at all to the facts and circumstances of the principal case, and, therefore, can not alter the doctrine established
by the previous decisions. The Lis Pendens Act merely provides
that the filing of the bill of complaint shall be constructive notice
to every person subsequently acquiring an interest in, or lien on,
the property that an action has been commenced against somebody, involving the property. However, the Lis Pendens Act
does not state that the filing of such complaint shall be the
commencement of such action as to the person so put on constructive notice.
Section 9 of the Liens Act provides that suit to enforce a lien
shall be commenced within two years after the completion of
the contract or of any extra or additional work or the furnishing
of extra or additional material. Since the Liens Act expressly
provides that "suit shall be commenced "-not merely that "constructive notice shall be given' '-and there is support for the
argument that suit is not commenced as to an unknown party
until the affidavit which authorizes making him a party is filed,
it would appear that the position taken by Mr. Justice Shaw
in his dissenting opinion is not entirely untenable.
However, since the majority of the court decided otherwise,
it appears that the care heretofore exercised by Illinois attorneys
to file the affidavit required by section 7 of the Chancery Act,
at the time of filing the bill, is no longer necessary. Filing of
this affidavit may now be withheld for six months, and the affidavits required by sections 7 and 12 may be filed at the same
time.
H. N. OSGOOD
BIDDING IN PROPERTY AT FORECLOSURE SALE AS A PRIVILEGE OF
TRUSTEE OR As DUTY AT DISCRETION OF CHANCELLOR.-The Illi-

nois Appellate Court of the First District in Chicago Title and
Trust Company v. Banburg' and in Chicago Title and Trust
Company v. Robin 2 has again held that the chancellor has the
1278 I. App. 1 (1934).
2278 111. App. 20 (1934).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

power, in foreclosure proceedings involving bond issues, to fix
an upset price for the sale of real property, and that in the event
no cash bid is made which meets the upset price, the court may
direct the trustee to bid the amount of the indebtedness and
take title for and on behalf of all the bondholders; and in Levy
3
the court held, in
v. Broadway-Carmen Building Corporation,
a decision involving a mortgage owned by one person, that the
court may fix a price and refuse to confirm a sale if a less
amount is bid.
The first case on this point that caused comment and speculation as to the possible further holdings of the reviewing courts
was Straus v. Chicago Title and Trust Company.4 The three
late decisions establish beyond a doubt that the holding in the
Straus case is the law of Illinois insofar as the Appellate Court
of the First District can establish it-only a reversal by the
Supreme Court of the state can disturb the practice as it is now
followed by the Cook County chancellors in foreclosure matters.
The cases raise several collateral questions, but those of primary importance and greatest interest are:
1. Upon what authority in the law may the chancellor fix
an upset price?
2. Upon what authority in the law may the chancellor direct
the trustee to bid the amount of the indebtedness and acquire
the title on behalf of the bondholders?
Before seeking an answer to these questions, it is well to make
a brief review of the three cases and note how the court disposed
of the contentions raised by appellants.
In the Bamburg case, on motion of one Sam Bernstein, alleged
owner of undeposited bonds of an issue of $765,000, the chancellor fixed an upset price of $200,000 and directed the trustee
to bid the amount of the indebtedness if no bona fide purchaser
bid that amount. One of the appellants, the bondholders committee, held 93.23 per cent of the issue. In the Robin case the
bond issue was smaller, and a sale had been held. The sale was
set aside, an upset price fixed, and the trustee ordered to bid, in
the event no cash bid equalled the upset price. Since the facts
are similar, the contentions of the appellants almost identical,
and since the court decided the Robin case by quoting liberally
from the Bamburg case, we may consider them together.
The first contention raised by appellants was that the first
decree was final and the supplemental decree undertook to alter
materially the terms and provisions of the first decree and that
the court was without jurisdiction to enter such a decree. The
Appellate Court responded to this with the answer: "The ora278 Ill. App. 293 (1934).
4 273 Ill.
App. 63 (1933). See comment in 12 Chicago-Kent Review 131.
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iginal decree reserved jurisdiction for certain proceedings and
the supplemental decree was within the reservation, thus provided. It is the general rule ... that the limitation of control of
the court to the term at which the decree was rendered does not
apply to the provisions inserted for the purpose of carrying the
decree into effect. "5
The second contention raised was that the trust deed contained
no provisions authorizing the trustee to bid and acquire the
property for the benefit of bondholders. In answer, the court
admitted a conflict in authority in other jurisdictions, but stood
squarely on its opinion in the Straus case, quoted from the case,
and refused further to consider the contention.
The third contention raised was that the court was without
jurisdiction to enter the decree, because all of the bondholders
were not made parties to the proceedings. The court responded:
"Here the trustee asserts in its bill that it is the sole representative of the bondholders and indeed the right to bring such suit
is by the trust deed expressly lodged in the trustee to the exclusion of the bondholders. Moreover, every class of party disclosed
by the proceedings is represented in its appeal-the trustee, the
committee, the depositors and the non-depositors .... The contention cannot be sustained."
The fourth contention was that even if it were assumed that
the trustee had the power to purchase, it could not deliver a
merchantable title for the reason that if the property came into
the possession of the trustee, it would be subject to all the burdens of a tenancy in common--dower rights and the lien of
judgment creditors. Here again the court stood squarely on its
opinion in the Straus case, and quoted from it the language:
"From what we have said, we think it appears that in case the
property is purchased by the trustee for the benefit of the bondholders, he will have active duties to perform under the direction
of the chancellor and can convey good title to the property ....
The bondholders' only interest is to receive their share of the
proceeds . . . . " The court held it an active trust and that the
Statute of Uses would not execute it.
The fifth contention is that even if the trustee had the power,
a purchase for the benefit of the bondholders was a matter
which was in the discretion of the trustee and not within the
discretion of the chancellor. Once again the court cited its
opinion in the Straus case in which it held to the contrary on the
authority of Corkery v. Dorsey.6 The further contention that
5 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Bamburg, 278 Ill. App. 1 (1934).
Citing
Sterling Nat. Bank v. Martin, 213 Ill. App. 566 (1919) ; Mariner v. Ingraham,
230 Ill. 130, 82 N. E. 577 (1907) ; and Totten v. Totten, 299 Ill. 43, 132 N. E.
277 (1921).
6223 Mass. 97, 111 N. E.795 (1916).
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the authority should have been exercised by the bondholders committee, because it had a plan of reorganization, was met by the
court with the argument that the findings of the decree bind
them on this matter, and say further: "At the speed at which
the committee moved the heirs and legatees of the bondholders
might possibly receive some benefit at some future time, but
there were no reasonable grounds for the belief that reasonably
immediate benefits were attainable through the committee. It was
well within the discretion of the chancellor to provide a more
efficient remedy under all the circumstances. "
In conclusion, the court stated: "We have not undertaken to
discuss the points and authorities cited by plaintiffs. Substantially every case upon which they rely worthy of discussion
was analyzed and considered in the Straus case .... we adhere
to the decision in the Straus case, and the facts of this case bring
it within the rules there announced."
We now come to the consideration of the vital questions:
First, upon what authority in the law may the chancellor fix
an upset price?
On this question it seems more than likely that the courts if
they so desire, may find substantial authority for the proposition
in adjudicated Illinois cases. It has long been the settled rule
in Illinois "that the chancellor has a broad discretion in reviewing the acts of a master in making a judicial sale, and that this
discretion, unless abused, will not be interfered with by a court
of review. ' '7 And while mere inadequacy of price might not,
alone, be sufficient to justify the court in setting aside a judicial
sale, yet, where the conditions under which the sale was held
tended to reduce or destroy competition,8 it is proper for the
It is only a short step to say that present economic conditions
are such that competition is reduced or destroyed and that the
court will take judicial notice of conditions and, accordingly,
may set aside the sale. This was, of course, the precise logic
of the court in the Levy case, where the court cited the case of
Suring State Bank v. Giese'0 in support of its theory.
7 Levy v. Broadway-Carmen, 278 Ill. App. 293, at p. 300 (1934); Worden v.
Rayburn, 313 Ill.
495, 145 N. E. 101 (1924); Farmers & Mechanics Bank v.
Griffith, 352 Ill. 323, 185 N. E. 854 (1933).
8The courts do not consider the argument that no true competition exists
in any foreclosure sale in Illinois because of the redemption period-that the
purchaser is at best buying a lawsuit. He may receive title to the property or
only his money back. It is also interesting to note that the cases cited in
support of the argument of the court in the Levy case are not foreclosure
sales, but other judicial sales.

court to do so. 9

9 Bondurant v. Bondurant, 251 Ill. 324, 96 N. E. 306 (1911) ; Smith v.
Huntoon, 134 111. 24, 24 N. E. 971 (1890).
10210 Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556 (1933).
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From the conclusion that the chancellor may set aside a sale
under the circumstances as recited, it follows that from convenience and expediency, upon a hearing of evidence as to value, the
chancellor may announce that he will not approve a sale which
is less than a certain fixed amount.
The second question-" Upon what authority in the law may
the chancellor direct the trustee to bid the amount of the indebtedness and acquire the title on behalf of the bondholders ?"-is
more difficult and finds no support in the law of our state. Accordingly, the court goes to other jurisdictions for support,
admits a conflict in the law, casts aside those decisions which
do not allow the bidding by trustees and follows those which do."
At the outset, the question must be subdivided into two subdivisions, namely (1) where the trust deed gives the trustee the
express power to bid, and (2) where the trust deed does not
give the power.
As to the first of these subdivisions, there is no question as to
the authority of the trustee to take title, but the whole question
is whether the making of the bid is a matter in the discretion
of the chancellor or the trustee. The Appellate Court has held
it a matter for the chancellor to decide. Corkery v. Dorsey12 is
the authority for the proposition on the grounds that it is the
duty of the trustee to protect the bondholders, that if he refuses
to act the court will.
In consideration of the second subdivision the court has held
that the trustee has the implied power to purchase, following
well considered decisions of other jurisdictions.' 3 The proposition,
reduced to pure equitable principles, is simply that trustees have
the power to do such acts as are necessary to carry into effect
the general provisions of the trust even though no express power
has been granted. "It is one of the most important and essential
powers of a court of equity to raise the implications growing out
of the state of the trust property, the purposes to be accomplished, and the mode adopted to that end, without violence to
or forced construction of the trust instrument. "14
The Bamburg and Robin cases have been appealed to the
Supreme Court of Illinois and much speculation and discussion
has arisen as to how that court will act in determining these vital
11 Nay Aug Lumber Co. v. Scranton Trust Co., 240 Pa. St. 500, 87 A. 843
(1913) ; Hoffman v. First Bond and Mortgage Co. of Hartford, 116 Conn. 320,
164 A. 656 (1933); First Nat. Bank in Wichita v. Neil, 137 Kan. 436, 20 P.
(2d) 528, 88 A. L. R. 1252 and note, 1260 (1933) ; Silver v. Wickfield
Farms, 209 Iowa 856, 227 N. W. 97 (1929).
12 223 Mass. 97, 111 N. E. 795 (1916).
13 See footnote 11.
14 Sturges v. Knapp, 31 Vt. 1, 52 (1858) ; 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence
(4th ed.) 2428.
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questions. It is extremely interesting to note in this regard that
in the unreported case of Dillon v. Elmore, Docket 22684,
Agenda 68 (a petition for rehearing has been granted), a case
which involves other points, Mr. Justice Herrick in delivery of
the unanimous decision of the court, said:
"The average small bondholder is not in a strong enough position financially to bid in the property at a foreclosure sale in
the absence of cash bidders. The court will take judicial notice
that in this period of economic distress there is a great depreciation of real estate and that property sold at foreclosure sale sells
for a much less price than in a normal time .... Under the pro-

visions here, the trustee may foreclose the trust deed, and, subject to the approval of the court, if necessary to protect the
interest of the bondholders as a class, may bid in the property at
the sale and apply the amount due on the bonds, as fixed by the
decree, without their production." u This language may presage
the result of the appeals in the Bamburg and Robin cases.
J. E. BRUNSWICK
DUTY OF PLAINTIFF TO DISCOVER RELATION OF JOINED DEFENDANTS TO CAUSE OF ACTION PRIOR TO TRIAL.-Where a number of

persons are involved in an accident, a person injured thereby
should not make all of the involved parties defendants to the
action and allow the case to reach trial before he has first
attempted to learn by means of motions for discovery and interrogatories which party is really to blame for the occurrence.
Such was the holding in the recent case of Aarseth v. Stein.' In
that case, the plaintiff, Aarseth, brought suit against a number
of defendants to recover for the wrongful death of Carl Aarseth.
The deceased was standing at the intersection of Central Avenue
and Jackson Boulevard in Chicago. Some of the defendants were
driving east on Jackson Boulevard, and some of them were driving south on Central Avenue. The cars of the two parties collided at the intersection and one of the cars was thrown upon
the sidewalk and against the deceased who was standing there.
The resulting injuries caused his death. All of the persons in
the two cars were made parties defendant, and, in addition, one
Stein-the evidence was not clear as to whether he was in the
car at the time or not. Stein and some of the other defendants
were found not guilty by direction of the court, and the plaintiff
5 Citing: Hoffman v. First Bond and Mortgage Co., 116 Conn. 320, 164 A.
656 (1933); Nay Aug. Lumber Co. v. Scranton Trust Co., 240 Pa. St. 500,
87A. 843 (1913) ; First Nat. Bank in Wichita v. Neil, 137 Kan. 436, 20 P. (2d)
528 (1933) ; Sturgess v. Knapp, 31 Vt. 1, 52 (1858) ; supra, all cases relied
upon the Appellate court in reaching the holdings discussed here.
1278 111. App. 16 (1934).
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made a motion for a new trial as to such persons. It was
granted as to the defendant Stein. Stein then applied to the
Appellate Court for leave to appeal from the order allowing
the plaintiff's motion for a new trial as to him. Such leave was
granted. The Appellate Court held that the trial court was
right in awarding the plaintiff a new trial as to the defendant
Stein, and sent the case back to the trial court.
The evidence upon which the trial judge had granted the
motion for a new trial had been adduced subsequent to the order
directing a verdict for the defendant. In affirming the granting
of this motion, the Appellate Court made the interesting observation that all such information as was presented at the motion for
the new trial should have been discovered before the suit even2
came to trial, because section 58 of the Civil Practice Act
and other provisions of that act together with the rules of the
Supreme Court furnish ample machinery for discovering before
trial who was to blame. 3 The court made this same observation
in Ladd v. Cochran and McCluer Company4 in these words, "It
is to be hoped that hereafter most, if not all, of the facts will be
adduced before the actual trial begins, pursuant to section 58,
and other sections of the new Practice Act in connection with
Rules 17, 18, and 19, adopted by our Supreme Court, so that
there will be fewer appeals and reversals for failure to bring out
the facts."
2 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 110, par. 186.
3 Sec. 58 (Discovery). "(1) Wherever a bill for discovery, or interrogatories
in a bill for relief, would heretofore have been available, the same discovery
may hereafter be had by motion filed in the cause wherein the matter sought
to be discovered would be used. (2) Discovery of documents which are or
have been in the possession of any other party to the action may be had,
admissions as to any fact may be requested of any other party, and the deposition of any party or of any person may be taken, at such times and under such
terms and conditions as may be prescribed by rules."
Rules: Sec. 104. Rule 10. "(2) Any party, by notice in writing, given
not later than ten days before trial, may call on any other party to admit, for
the purposes of the cause, matter or issue only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice, which can be fairly admitted without qualification or
explanation as stated therein. In case of refusal or neglect to admit the same
within four days after service of such notice, or within such further time as
may be allowed by the court or a judge, the expenses incurred in proving such
fact or facts, including a reasonable counsel fee for the time and attention
devoted thereto, must be ascertained at the trial and paid by the party so
neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the cause, matter or issue may be,
unless at the trial or hearing, the court or a judge certify that the refusal to
admit was reasonable, or unless the court or a judge, at any time, shall
order or direct otherwise. Any admission made in pursuance of such notice
is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the particular cause,
matter or issue, and not as an admission to be used against the party on any
other occasion or in favor of any person other than the party giving the notice.
The court or a judge, at any time, may allow any party to amend or withdraw
any admission so made on such terms as may be just."
4 274 Ill. App. 427 (1934).
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Prior to the passage of the Civil Practice Act, the concensus
of opinion seems to have been that the use of and need for bills
of discovery was gradually disappearing because of the increasing
liberality of the courts in allowing the taking of depositions, because of the provisions of the Evidence Act, and the effectiveness
of the subpoena duces tecum.5 Now, however, the courts are
affirmatively and positively suggesting and recommending at
the time they remand a case to the trial court that the parties
take advantage of the machinery provided for them under the
new Civil Practice Act for ascertaining facts and documents
having a bearing upon a case before that case is ever reached
for trial.'
In the Aarseth case, the fact that should have been determined
before trial was the agency relation existing between the defendants Stein and Huron and the Loaches, and then it would have
been unnecessary to join so many persons as defendants in the
action and a great deal of time and expense would have been
saved. When persons who are in the relationship of principal
and agent have been made defendants, it has always been incumbent upon the plaintiff to elect which of these he shall hold,
since he could not hold them both. In order, however, for the
election to constitute an estoppel, it must be shown that the
plaintiff knew the relationship to exist. 7 In the Aarseth case it
is clear that at the time of the trial the plaintiff did not realize
that such a relationship did exist between Stein and the garage
owners. The trial court recognized this fact when it granted a
new trial upon the ascertainment of such information, and the
Appellate Court did the same when it affirmed the granting of
the new trial. The latter court went further, however, than
merely affirming the order when it stated that, even though the
plaintiff was ignorant of the existence of the relation, he should
have taken advantage of the machinery provided for him and
made an attempt to discover that fact before the case was
reached for trial. Hence, the court not only affirmed the doctrine
of election where the relation of principal and agent did exist
but put a positive duty on the plaintiff to inquire into and ascer5 "I believe the subject of discovery under our present system has lost a
great deal of its importance; that today we rarely find a bill for relief framed
with an idea to discovery, and that a bill of discovery is rather rarely used.
"The statutes, however, seemed to have revived a great deal of interest in the
subject of discovery." Edward W. Hinton. Stenographic report of lectures
given in Law 447 at the University College, October, November, December,
1933, at page 239.
6 For a valuable article on the practical operation of the provisions of the
Civil Practice Act relating to discovery see George Ragland, Jr., "Discovery
Before Trial Under the Illinois Civil Practice Act," 28 Ill. Law Rev. 875
(March 1934).
7 Gardner v. Peasley, 143 Mass. 382, 9 N. E. 833 (1887).
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tain the existence of such relation before the trial commenced.
Such holding is all the more interesting in the light of the very
liberal provisions of the Practice Act with reference to the
joinder of defendants8 and of such cases as Cuddy v. Horn,9
Colegrave v. New York and New Haven Railroad Company' ° and
others."
Since the use of a bill for discovery before the Civil Practice
Act was passed was not in the least mandatory or necessary but
was entirely optional with the parties, the present attitude of
the courts is a distinct change from what it used to be. The court
dockets all over the country are becoming increasingly congested;
and, since the legislature has seen fit to pass provisions that will
tend to alleviate some of these crowded conditions, it is no more
than right that the people should make use of them, and that
they should be admonished by the courts for their failure to
do so.
G. E. HALL, JR.
Do THE PROVISIONS FOR APPEAL IN THE ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE ACT APPLY TO REVIEWS OF JUDGMENTS OF THE CRIMINAL
COURT?-Defcndant Cowdrey was found guilty of violating the

Motor Fuel Tax law and fined $5,000.

The defendant appealed

8 Art. 5, Sec. 24:
"(1) Any person may be made a defendant who, either jointly, severally, or
in the alternative, is alleged to have or claim an interest in the controversy, or
in any part thereof, or in the transaction or series of transactions out of which
the same arose, or whom it is necessary to make a party for the complete determination or settlement of any question involved therein, or against whom a
liability is asserted either jointly, severally or in the alternative arising out of
the same transaction or series of transactions, regardless of the number of
causes of action joined.
"(2) It shall not be necessary that each defendant shall be interested as to
all the relief prayed for, or as to every cause of action included in any proceeding against him; but the court may make such order as may be just to
prevent any defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense by being
required to attend any proceedings in which he may have no interest.
"(3) Where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants, and state his claim
against them in the alternative in the same count or plead separate counts in
the alternative against different defendants, to the intent that the question
which, if any, of the defendants is liable and to what extent, may be determined
as between the parties."
946 Mich. 569, 10 N. W. 32 (1881).
10 20 N. Y. 492.
11 Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v. Murray's Admx., 53 Ohio St. 570, 42 N. E. 596.
"Concert is not necessary to the right to join participants in a single wrong
if a neglect to perform common duty. Thus in collision cases injuring a passenger both railroads or both vessels may be jointly sued notwithstanding the
different degrees of care owed." Clement Bates, A Treatise on Pleading,
Practice, Parties, and Forms Under the Code, p. 73, sec. 101.
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from this verdict to the Appellate Court for the First District.'
Before the passage of the Civil Practice Act, a judgment by a
criminal court could be reviewed only upon writ of error. 2 The
defendant, however, contended that the Civil Practice Act
changed this procedure, that by section 74 of this act and
Rule 28 of the Supreme Court of Illinois, it is now possible to
have a judgment of a criminal court reviewed by an appeal. On
motion by the State's Attorney on behalf of the People, the
court dismissed the appeal.
The Civil Practice Act provides: "Every order, determination,
decision, judgment or decree, rendered in any civil proceeding,
if reviewable by the Supreme or Appellate Courts of this state
by writ of error, appeal or otherwise, shall hereafter be subject
to review by notice of appeal, and such review shall be designated an appeal and shall constitute a continuation of the proceedings in the court below. Such appeal shall be deemed to
present to the court all issues which heretofore have been presented by appeal and writ of error."3
Rule 28 of the Supreme Court provides: "The provisions of
the Civil Practice Act and the rules of this court referring to
notice of appeal, appellant and appellee, shall, to the extent applicable, include writ of error and defendant in error in criminal
cases and in civil cases where writ of error is preserved as a
method of review.
"If a writ of error be improvidently sued out in a case where
the proper method of review is by writ of error, this alone shall
not be grounds for dismissal, but if the issue of the case sufficiently appear upon the record before the court of review, the
case shall be considered as if the proper method of review had
been employed."
In determining this appeal, the court turned to the language
of the Civil Practice Act, which is that "The provisions of this
act shall apply to all civil proceedings both at law and in
equity." 4 The court declared that this clearly limits the right
to appeal under section 74 to civil cases. Thus, the Civil
Practice Act does not eliminate the procedure that now applies
to practice in criminal cases, and the Criminal Code 5 is still in
full force and effect, and the defendant must follow its
provisions.
R. L. HUFF
1 People v. Cowdrey, 278 III. App. 65 (1934).
2 People v. Klyczek, 307 IIl. 150, 138 N. E. 275 (1923) ; Gallagher v. People,
207 Ill.
247, 69 N. E. 783 (1904).
3 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 110, par. 202 (1).
4 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 110, par. 129.
5 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 38, par. 839.
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ILLINOIS ANTI-INJUNCTION LABOR LAW.

-In the recent case of Penske Brothers v. Upholsterers' Union,1
the Illinois Supreme Court sustains the constitutionality of the
first section of "An act relating to disputes concerning terms
and conditions of employment," commonly known as the AntiInjunction Law. 2 The act forbids the enjoining of peaceful striking and picketing. The case was heard upon bill and answer
when the complainants sought an injunction to restrain all picketing, peaceful and otherwise. The defendants contended that
the court should have omitted from the decree the peaceful acts
enumerated as permissible in the statute. The plaintiff squarely
challenged the constitutionality of the act, setting up various
grounds for such challenge, principal among which is that the
act contravenes both the due process and equal-protection clauses
of the state and Federal constitutions. The court sustained the
act as a valid exercise of the police power, based upon a reasonable classification, and pointed out that it does not forbid the
enjoining of unlawful acts committed in derogation of property
rights but by reasonable implication legalizes the acts complained of. The court went even further and said that the act
is merely declaratory of the existing law; that it does not constitute a deprivation of a remedy guaranteed by the constitution
for injury to property,3 since the acts in question are legal and
not wrongful; and that it does not deprive courts of equity of
jurisdiction expressly conferred by the constitution, 4 since a
court of equity never has a right to enjoin acts which are neither
wrongful nor injurious.
Such anti-injunction laws have now been passed by the Fed1 358 Ill. 239, 193 N. E. 112, rehearing denied Dec. 11, 1934.

2 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 22, par. 58. Approved June 19, 1925.
The Act reads:

"No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of this state,
or by a judge or the judges thereof in any case involving terms or conditions
of employment, enjoining or restraining any person or persons, either singly or
in concert, from terminating any relation or employment or from ceasing to
perform any work or labor, or from peaceably and without threats or intimida-

tion recommending, advising, or persuading others so to do; or from peaceably
and without threats or intimidation being upon any public street, or thoroughfare or highway for the purpose of obtaining or communicating information, or
to peaceably and without threats or intimidation cease to employ any party to

a labor dispute, or to recommend, advise, or persuade others so to do."
3l1. Const., Art. II, sec. 19:
"Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation; he ought

to obtain, by law, right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay."
4 Ill. Const., Art. VI, sec. 12:

"The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes in law and
equity. . ... "
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eral government and by a number of the states. The Federal statute is commonly known as the Clayton Act. 5 Such statutes have,
in general, been based upon the English Trades Dispute Act of
1906, differing in form but achieving the same legal result. The
English act says that "it shall be lawful" to do the acts in question, whereas the American statutes 6directly forbid the granting
of injunctions to restrain the same.
Such statutes have, in general, been held to be merely declaratory of, and not to change, the law. The view seems to prevail
that the statutes will be considered unconstitutional only to the
extent that they attempt to render legal that which would otherwise have been unlawful, since
to such extent they take property
7
without due process of law.
The leading case upon the constitutionality of anti-injunction
laws is the United States Supreme Court case of Truax v. Corrigan,s an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of
Arizona upholding an anti-injunction statute in that state. In
that case the picketing was accompanied by denunciation of the
employer as unfair to union labor, by appeals to customers to
withdraw their patronage, and by circulation of handbills containing abusive and libelous charges against employers, employees, and patrons, and intimations of injury to future patrons.
In reversing the judgment, the United States Supreme Court
held that the statute, as interpreted by the Arizona courts, was
unconstitutional, in that it contravened both the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution. Withdrawing the only adequate remedy against unlawful picketing and
accompanying threats and libels constituted a deprivation of
property without due process of law. The withdrawal of injunctive relief only in disputes between employers and employees, and not in other cases where similar attacks might be
made by organized groups against the business of an individual,
constituted the granting of a special immunity and denial of the
equal protection of the law. The case was a five to four decision.
It must be remembered that the statute was held unconstitutional
only as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Arizona, which interpretation extended it to illegal as well as legal acts of picketing. The Illinois Supreme Court distinguishes the principal case
5 October 15, 1914. U. S. Comp. Stat., sec. 1243d, U. S. C. A., tit. 29, sec. 52.
6 See discussion by Amidon, J., in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Brosseau, 286
F. 414 (1923).
7 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S.
184, 66 L. Ed. 189, 42 S. Ct. 72, 27 A. L. R. 360 (1921) ; Stephens v. Ohio State
Telephone Co., 240 F. 759 (1917); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Retail
Clerks' International Protective Assn., 250 F. 890 (1918) ; A. J. Monday Co. v.
Automobile, Aircraft & Vehicle Workers, 171 Wis. 532, 177 N. W. 867 (1920).
8 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. Ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A. L. R. 375 (1921).
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upon this ground, pointing out that the striking defendants seek
merely to have excepted from the decree the peaceful acts of
picketing enumerated by the statute.
In another United States Supreme Court case, American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trade Council,9 decided at the
same term with Truax v. Corrigan,the court held that picketing
in groups of from four to twelve near an employer's place of
business during a strike, accompanied by attempts at persuasion,
or communication with those entering or leaving the plant, with
the inevitable result of intimidation of employees and would-be
employees, and of obstruction of, and interference with, the
business of the employer, is unlawful and may be enjoined, notwithstanding the provisions of the Clayton Act.
The principal case treated the Illinois cases decided before the
statute, namely, O'Brien v. The People,10 Franklin Union v. The
People," and A. R. Barnes and Company v. Chicago Typographical Union,12 and the court refuted the claim that it is committed
to the doctrine that peaceful picketing is illegal by distinguishing these cases, pointing out that in each case there was involved
either unlawful violence or intimidation, a malicious intent to
injure the employer's business rather than to promote the employees interests, or a secondary boycott.
G. S. STANSELL
RIGHT OF CONDITIONAL VENDOR TO REMOVE SPRINKLER SYSTEM

ATTACHED TO FREEHOLD.-The recent Illinois Supreme Court de-

cision of National Bank of Republic v. Wells-Jackson Corporation' holds that the vendor of a sprinkler system, attached to the
freehold and sold under an unrecorded conditional sales contract
to a tenant holding a ninety-nine year lease, which called for the
erection of a building equipped with such a system, is not
estopped from claiming the sprinkler as against the landlord who
declares the lease forfeited. The decision is based squarely upon2
the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act as enacted in Illinois.
9 Cited in footnote 7.

10 216

Ill. 354, 75 N. E. 108, 108 Am. St. Rep. 219, 3 Ann. Cas. 966 (1905).
11220 Ill. 355, 77 N. E. 176, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1001, 110 Am. St. Rep. 248
(1906).
12 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 940, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1018, 13 Ann. Cas. 54
(1908).
1358 11. 356, 193 N. E. 215 (1934).
2 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 121a, par. 23 (1):
"Where there is a contract to sell specific goods, or where goods are subsequently appropriated to the contract, the seller may, by the terms of the contract or appropriation, reserve the right of possession or property in the goods
until certain conditions have been fulfilled. The right of possession or property
may be thus reserved notwithstanding the delivery of the goods to the buyer or
to the carrier or other bailee for the purpose of transmission to the buyer."
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In 1925, the court committed itself, in the case of ShererGillett Company v. Long,3 to the doctrine here enunciated. In
that case, however, the fixture in question was not attached to
the realty but consisted merely of a display counter. There the
contest was between the conditional vendor and a purchaser for
value from the conditional vendee.
This phase of the law of fixtures has had an interesting development in Illinois. Before the promulgation of the Uniform
Sales Act the courts of most jurisdictions held that the conditional vendor was not estopped to claim as against a bona fide
purchaser. 4 Illinois, however, held that a delivery of personal
property to the purchaser upon a contract of conditional sale,
with a retention of title in the seller, amounted to a constructive
fraud, which postponed the rights of those who, without notice,
vendee, who had been given the
had dealt with the conditional
5
indicia of ownership.
In Sherer-Gillett Company v. Long, the court determined that
the Uniform Sales Act had changed the law in Illinois, and
brought it substantially into conformity with the practice prevailing in other jurisdictions before the act was introduced. Today, in most jurisdictions, conditional sales contracts must be
recorded in order to be valid as to third parties. In Illinois, however, such recording is not required-doubtless in deference to
the convenience and advantage of certain commercial concerns
which transact a large share of their business by means of conditional sales.
The result is the rule enunciated in the principle case, which
carries the doctrine of Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long to its fullest
implications by applying the rule to fixtures actually annexed
to the realty. While it is true that the principal case limits the
application of the doctrine to those cases where the removal
will not "substantially injure" the premises, such limitation
appears of but narrow application when it is remembered that
in the instant case the sprinkler system was actually bolted into
the walls and ceilings of the building. It is improbable that
many cases will occur where greater injury would result from
removal.
While this decision may facilitate the sale of certain types of
personal property, it certainly will place a correspondingly
greater burden of inquiry and investigation upon the purchaser
of improved realty. In view of the fate of recently introduced
3 318 Ill. 432, 149 N. E. 225 (1925).
4 Harkness v. Russell & Co., 118 U. S. 663, 7 S. Ct. 51, 30 L. Ed. 285 (1886);

Arnold v. Chandler Motors, 45 R. I. 469, 123 A. 85 (1924).
5 Gilbert v. Nat. Cash Register Co., 176 111. 288, 52 N. E. 22 (1898) ; Brundage v. Camp, 21 111. 329 (1859).
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legislative bills requiring the recording of conditional sales contracts, it is doubtful if any statutory relief may be expected.'
G.
RELIEF

WORKER

AS

"EMPLOYEE"

S.

STANSELL

UNDER

WORKMEN'S

COM-

AcT.-Modern economic conditions have brought forth
numerous new decisions which are purely the product of the times,
and one of the more reasonable of such decisions, although radical
as compared with former holdings, is Industrial Commission of
Ohio v. McWhorter, decided in November, 1934.1 A resident of
Columbus had applied to the city charities for relief and was
given two relief orders for groceries. Later, he was given what
was designated as a "work card," entitling him to work two
days as a relief worker. Payment for such services was to be
alternately in cash and in groceries of equal value. After working under this card, he was given others, and, pursuant to instructions, he reported to a city foreman in some unknown department, where, on one occasion in the course of his work, he
was injured. He applied for right to participate in the state
insurance fund for injuries sustained while in the city's employ
as "relief worker." The state Industrial Commission denied
his claim on the ground that he had not proven he was an
"employee" under the act at the time of the injury. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the claimant was an "employee" under the statute. It based its decision on the very
broad provisions in the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act
which read:
"The term 'employee,' 'workman' and 'operative' as used in
this act shall be construed to mean:
"1. Every person in the service of the state, or of any county,
city, township, incorporated village or school district therein,
including regular members of lawfully constituted police and
fire departments of cities and villages, under any appointment or
contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except any
official of the state, or of any county, city, township, incorporated
village or school district therein.'"2
The court said this language was broad enough to cover the
facts in this case, and added that it felt such a holding more in
keeping with the policy of present work-relief legislation than to
hold the applicant to be a pauper or ward of the city.
Previous decisions in other courts have tended against such a
PENSATION

6 For an extensive discussion of recent developments in conditional sales
contracts, see Charles Francis Baker, "Some Limitations on the Remedies of

the Vendor in Conditional Sales Contracts," 13 Chicago-Kent Review 1.
1 193 N. E. 620 (Ohio, 1934).
2 Ohio General Code, sec. 1465.61.
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holding. On the west coast we find the California Supreme Court
holding, in McBurney v. IndustrialAccident Commission,3 under
similar facts-a man on relief working under a work card for
the city of Monrovia, injured in the course of his employmentthat such worker was not an employee as defined by law, because
the essential relationship of employer and employee under a contract of employment was lacking. The state Workmen's Compensation Act there was practically identical with that of Ohio.
But the court said that the county supporting an indigent man
was entitled to his services, and since he could not sue the county
for the reasonable value of the services rendered, no contract for
hire existed, and the payment from state relief funds was not
wages. This ruling was followed a few months later by two cases
in the California Appellate Court on similar facts-Martin v.
Industrial Accident Commission,4 and Rico et al. v. Industrial
Accident Commission.,
West Virginia 6 and North Carolina 7 both refused to classify
the relief worker as an "employee" under their workmen's compensation acts; but the West Virginia act was slightly different
in that it classified employees as all persons in the service of
employers who were regularly employing other persons to carry
on their business. The North Carolina act, however, was nearly
identical with the Ohio act, but the North Carolina court held
directly opposite to the Ohio decision. It said that the worker
was not receiving remuneration for his work but was being paid
only for relief, and cited the West Virginia case.
In the Michigan case of Vaivida v. City of Grand Rapids,8 the
majority of the court held there should be no award under the
compensation act to a relief worker, because, it was said, the right
of a municipality to the services of its paupers which it is called
on to support arises not out of contract but out of its statutory
duty to care for such poor persons. However, a strong dissenting
opinion reasoned that the fact that the jobs were "made work"
was not important, since the relationship between the parties was
governed by what they did and not why they did it. The dissent
also mentioned that the social features of the plan might be better served by holding the relationship one of employer and
employee.
3220 Cal. 124, 30 P. (2d) 414 (1934).
4 137 Cal. App. 346, 30 P. (2d) 527 (1934).
5 137 Cal. App. 392, 30 P. (2d)

584 (1934).
6Basham v. County Court of Kanawha County, 171 S. E. 893 (1933).
7 Jackson v. North Carolina Emergency Relief Administration, 206 N. C. 274,
173 S. E. 580 (1934); Bell v. City of Raleigh, 206 N. C. 275, 173 S. E. 581
(1934).
8 264 Mich. 204, 249 N. W. 826 (1933).

CHICAGO-KENT

REVIEW

As yet no such case has arisen in Illinois, and it is an open
question as to which way the court would hold. The definition
of an "employee" under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Act is almost exactly the same as that of the Ohio act, 9 and in
construing it, the Illinois Supreme Court has said: "The definition of the word 'employee' as 'every person in the service of
another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or
written' is to be broadly construed."' 1 Further, the Illinois
Commission created by the Emergency Relief Act of June, 1933,
has set up a system of work relief very similar to that of Ohio,
and the payment of the relief in both cases is from the sale of
bonds authorized by the legislature." The attitude of the Illinois
court as expressed in the foregoing quotation suggests that Illinois, like Ohio, might similarly construe our act under analogous
circumstances.
HELEN W.

MUNSERT

INTENTION OF OWNER OF TANGIBLE CHATTEL AS AFFECTING
DETERMINATION OF SITUS FOR INHERITANCE TAx.-The ancient

doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam, as applied to the situs
of tangible personal property for purposes of succession or inheritance tax, appears to have been relegated to the past by the
decision in Frick v. Pennsylvania.' However, the recent decision
of the United States Supreme Court in the case of City Bank
Farmers Trust Company v. Schnader2 indicates that there may
still be some controversial points to be decided in applying the
doctrine in tax cases that the situs is where the property is
found and not at the domicile of the decedent.
The principal case involved the question of inheritance tax on
a collection of valuable paintings, the property of Thomas B.
Clarke, who died domiciled in New York. In March, 1928, Clarke,
at the request of the director of a Pennsylvania art museum,
loaned to it the paintings. At the time of the loan, they were
and long had been kept in the city of New York. When the pictures were sent to Pennsylvania, the owner surrendered his lease
for the space in New York where they had been stored, and
thereafter he did nothing to secure other space. However, suitable space was always readily available in New York. The arrangement with the museum was oral; no consideration was to
9Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 48, par. 142.
10 Allen-Garcia Co. v. Industrial Commission, 334 Il. 390, 166 N. E. 78
(1929).
11 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 23, pars. 393-402.
1268 U. S. 473, 69 L. Ed. 1058, 42 A. L. R. 316 (1925).
279 L. Ed. 68 (1934).
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be paid, and it was understood that at any time, on Clarke's
request, the pictures would be restored to him.
In 1929, the owner wrote the director of the museum, at the
director's solicitation, that he would sell the paintings to anyone who would present them to the museum. It was understood
that he would allow the pictures to remain a reasonable time for
the director to find a donor. In May, 1930, Clarke stated that
this arrangement would terminate June 17, 1930. At the director's request, he permitted the pictures to remain, upon the
understanding that, whenever he so requested, they would be
returned to him in New York. Thereafter, he was willing to sell
the collection as a whole, for presentation to the Pennsylvania
museum or to a substantially similar institution.
The museum was not conducted for profit. It secured through
voluntary loans from nonresidents a substantial portion of the
works of art which it displayed. None of these was regarded or
intended as a permanent loan. It is customary for public
museums to secure pictures for exhibition in this manner. The
court found that the period which elapsed until Clarke's death
was shorter than the usual period of such loans. Clarke made
no definite plans or request for return to New York of the paintings. In April, 1929, four paintings were sent to Virginia for
exhibition and were returned in May. When he died, January 18,
1931, all of the paintings were at the Pennsylvania museum.
Under his will, which was probated in New York, the City
Bank Farmers Trust Company was named as executor. Under
the residuary clause, the paintings were transferred to it as
trustee. The attorney general and secretary of revenue of Pennsylvania, pursuant to statute,3 appraised and assessed the pictures for the purpose of collecting the inheritance tax. The Trust
Company brought suit to enjoin enforcement and collection of
the tax. The complaint was so framed as to call for a decision
whether Pennsylvania or New York was entitled to the tax.
The New York Tax Commission, as amicus curiae, filed briefs,
and the action became, in effect, a contest between Pennsylvania
and New York, as to which state was entitled to the tax, since
it was conceded that the transfer could not be subjected to taxes
3 Section 1, Act of June 20, 1919, P. L. 521, 72 P. S. sec. 2301, as last
amended by the Act of June 22, 1931, P. L. 690, provides in part as follows:
"Section 1....
a tax shall be, and is hereby imposed upon the transfer of any
property, real or personal . . to persons or corporations in the following
cases: . . . (b) When the transfer is by will or intestate laws . . . of goods,
wares or merchandise within this Commonwealth, or of shares of stock of corporations of this Commonwealth, or of national banking associations located
in this Commonwealth, and the decedent was a nonresident of the Commonwealth at the time of his death."
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imposed by more than one state.4 It was held that the paintings
belonging to the decedent, on exhibition in the Pennsylvania
museum at the time of his death, then had an actual situs in that
state, and the transfer was subject to the Pennsylvania inheritance tax.
This decision appears to raise and leave unanswered at least
one question: Is the mere physical presence of tangible personal
property of a nonresident decedent sufficient to give the state of
its situs jurisdiction to levy and collect a succession or inheritance tax, or is something more required? That the court may
not regard mere physical presence as sufficient, is indicated by
the following excerpt from the opinion:
"The location of the portraits in Pennsylvania was not merely
transient, transitory or temporary but it was fixed in an established abiding place in which they remained for a long time....
By sending them into Pennsylvania and by his ommission to have
them returned to New York and his lack of definite intention ever
so to do Clarke failed to maintain an actual situs in New York
and created one for them in Pennsylvania."
Unless this statement is pure dictum, it would appear to indicate that, in the opinion of the court, an owner of tangible personal property may send such property into another state and,
by maintaining a "definite intention" to have it returned, may
prevent it from acquiring a situs for taxation in the other state.
This appears to raise a rather indefinite standard. It might even
appear from this language that the court will apply to the determination of the situs of tangible personal property the same
test as in determination of personal domicile-residence and
intention of remaining. These two things must concur to establish domicile, 5 but if the intention is established, length of residence becomes immaterial. If the intention is not established,
length of residence will not establish the domicile. If the statement of the court in the principal case indicates that, by analogy,
the domiciliary test will be applied to determine situs, the length
of time the property remained in Pennsylvania would be immaterial-lack of intent to have it returned to New York would
be the governing factor. It appears somewhat difficult to find
4 The double taxation problem was settled by the following cases: Frick v.
Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 69 L. Ed. 1058 (1925) ; Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 93, 74 L. Ed. 180, 184, 67 A. L. R. 386 (1929);
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 210, 74 L. Ed. 371, 374,
65 A. L. R. 1000 (1930); First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 326, 327,
76 L. Ed. 313, 318, 319, 77 A. L. R. 1401 (1932).
5 White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S. E. 596, 13 Am. St. Rep. 896 (1888);
Munro v. Munro, 7 Clark & F. 842, 7 Eng. Rep. 1288 (1840) ; Hallett v. Bassett,
100 Mass. 167 (1868) ; Long v. Ryan, 30 Grat. (71 Va.) 718 (1878) ; Bradley v.
Lowry, 1 Speer Eq. (S. C.) 1, 39 Am. Dec. 142 (1842) ; Wharton, Conflict of
Laws, sec. 21; Dicey, Domicile, p. 44.
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in the facts and circumstances of the principal case a "lack of
definite intention" (ever to have the paintings returned to New
York) sufficient to establish an analogy to the animus manendi
test of domicile.
The question in Frick v. Pennsylvania was the converse of
that presented by the principal case. The Frick case decided
that a state could not impose a tax upon the transfer, on the
death of the owner, of property having an actual situs in other
states, although the owner died domiciled within the limits of the
state which attempted to impose the tax. The principal case
decides, conversely, that the state in which the property has
actual situs may impose the tax, regardless of the domicile of
the owner.
In the Frick case, there was no question but that the situs of
the property in New York and Massachusetts-transfer of which
Pennsylvania attempted to tax-was permanent and not merely
"transient, transitory, or temporary." The Frick collection of
rare art treasures was housed in a building in New York city
especially constructed for the purpose. Other property having
situs in New York consisted of furniture, household furnishings,
automobiles, tools, etc., in Mr. Frick's New York house and garage. The Massachusetts property consisted of objects of art,
furniture, household furnishings, farming implements, etc.,
which were permanently located on the Frick estate at Pride's
Crossing, Massachusetts.
In Commonwealth v. PresbyterianHospital,6 which followed
the Frick case, the Pennsylvania courts decided that an inheritance tax might be charged on the transfer of tangible personal
property which was located in the commonwealth and which
belonged to the estate of a decedent domiciled in another state
at the time of his death. In this case, however, the property was
real estate-although perhaps equitably converted by the terms
of the will-located in Pennsylvania, so there was no doubt as
to the permanency of its situs.
It is said that the state does not lose the right to tax the
property of one of its citizens unless it is permanently removed
from its limits; and property which is in another state for a
temporary purpose may still be fixed in the state of the owner's
domicile.' It is also stated that to acquire a situs in a state
other than the domicile of the owner, tangible personal property
must have a definite location there, accompanied by some degree
of permanency; mere temporary or transient presence in the
state is not sufficient.
6287 Pa. 49, 134 A. 427 (1926).
7 26 R. C. L. 278, sec. 245.
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One of the cases" cited by Ruling Case Law as authority for
this doctrine is of no value for the purpose of this discussion,
9
as it was a case of intangibles, and in Blodgett v. Silberman,
the United States Supreme Court refused to apply the rule of
Frick v. Pennsylvania to intangibles. The ancient doctrine of
mobilia sequuntur personam still stands in the Federal courts
where intangibles are involved. New York ex rel. New York
C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Miller 10 presented a case of taxation on
railway rolling stock, absent in the course of business. In making return for purposes of its capital stock tax, the railroad, a
New York corporation, deducted from its return the value of
cars which were absent from the state, but the United States
Supreme Court held that, although in another state for temporary purpose, the rolling stock was still fixed in the state of
the owner's domicile. In Irvin v. New Orleans, St. Louis and
Chicago Railroad Co.," the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
ferry steamer used for ferrying cars across the river from Cairo,
Illinois, to the opposite Kentucky shore was taxable in Illinois
because when not in use, it was laid up at Cairo, which, therefore, became its "home port."
In attempting to determine just where the line is to be drawn
in fixing situs, it may be interesting to consider the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Miller together
with the two earlier decisions in Union Refrigerator Transit
Company v. Kentucky 12 and Pullman's Palace Car Company v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.'3 In the Union Regrigerator
case, the state of Kentucky attempted to tax the entire 2,000 cars
of the transit company, a Kentucky corporation, although these
cars were rented to shippers who took possession in Wisconsin
and used them for shipment in the United States, Canada, and
Mexico. It was decided that Kentucky could only tax such proportion of cars as, under a system of averages based on gross
earnings, were shown to be used in Kentucky. In the opinion of
the court, due process of law was denied the corporation when
it was taxed upon its rolling stock permanently located in other
states and employed there in prosecution of its business. The
court held that "according to the general consensus of opinion
lately" tangible personal property was taxable in the state where
it was permanently located and employed, and where it received
8 Commonwealth v. R. G. Dun & Co., 126 Ky. 108, 102 S. W. 859, 10 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 920 (1907).
9277 U. S. 1, 72 L. Ed. 749 (1927).
10202 U. S. 584, 50 L. Ed. 1155 (1906).
1194 Ill. 105, 34 Am. Rep. 208 (1879).
12 199 U. S. 194, 50 L. Ed. 150 (1905).
13 141 U. S. 18, 35 L. Ed. 613 (1890).
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its entire protection, irrespective of the domicile of the owner.
In the Pullman case, the court upheld the right of Pennsylvania
to tax rolling stock of an Illinois corporation regularly employed
in Pennsylvania on certain routes of travel, stating that, while
particular cars might not remain in the state, the company had
at all times, substantially the same number of cars within the
state and continuously and constantly used there a portion of
its property.
New York v. Miller was decided after both of the foregoing
cases, and the temporary absence of the property from the state
was the point on which New York jurisdiction to tax was upheld. In the Refrigerator and Pullman cases, the permanent
nature of the situs of the property appears to have been the
deciding factor. It would appear, therefore, that there is a line
somewhere between "temporary" and "permanent" situs, where
one state loses and the other acquires jurisdiction to tax.
The three cases just compared were, of course, cases of direct
property taxes, while the principal case is one of succession or
inheritance tax. However, in Frick v. Pennsylvania, the court
placed the power of a state to impose a succession tax on tangible
personal property of a nonresident decedent upon the same basis
as in the case of a direct property tax. The court, in the Frick
case, recognized that the Pennsylvania tax was not a property tax
but one laid on transfer of property on the death of the owner.
However, having recognized this fact, it said: "But to impose
either tax, the state must have jurisdiction over the thing taxed;
to impose either without such jurisdiction is mere extortion and
in contravention of due process of law."
It may be that no definite line can be established. If mere
presence in the jurisdiction is not sufficient to establish situs for
taxation, it would appear that, had the paintings in the principal
case been shipped to Pennsylvania for a one-day exhibition only,
a situs for taxation in Pennsylvania would not have been established, even though the owner had expressed his willingness to
sell them if a buyer should appear. Would mere presence in the
state for a week, a month, a year, or for any fixed and definite
period establish the line? If mere presence in the jurisdiction
for any definite period is not sufficient, what facts and circumstances will establish "lack of definite intent" ever to return the
property to the state of the owner's domicile? Perhaps no definite standard is possible, but the final solution will be that expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Hudson County Water Company v. McCarter.14 The eminent justice was there speaking of
public policy, but it may be that his remarks will be found applicable to situs for taxation of tangible personal property:
14

209 U. S. 349, 52 L. Ed. 828 (1908).
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"The boundary at which the conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but points
in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that
this or that concrete case falls on the nearer or the farther side."
If more than mere situs in the state is required to confer
jurisdiction to tax, the principal case appears, very nearly at
least, to establish a point in the line.
H. N. OSGOOD
SUFFICIENCY

OF
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POWER OF APPOINTMENT.-The case of Old Colony Trust Company of Boston v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,' decided
under Massachusetts law last December, directs attention to
Illinois cases which take a stand between two conflicting views
in other states. The Federal decision continues the stand of Massachusetts under the common law that the effect of a residuary
devise by one holding a power of appointment, is to execute that
power, unless a clear intention not to exercise it appears. Two
trusts, established in Massachusetts, made Minot the beneficiary
and gave him the power to appoint trustees. On a petition by
Minot's executor to review a decision of he Board of Tax Appeals, the court ruled that the residuary clause of his will, alone,
operated as an execution of these powers of appointment, and
the corpus of both trusts became taxable as part of his estate.
Massachusetts, applying a presumption that a testator who
uses a general residuary clause exhibits an intention to devise all
the property he can dispose of, logically concludes that he must
have meant to exercise the power where it is necessary to make
a valid disposition. Only a clear opposite intention manifested
in the will itself can obviate this conclusion.
2
Massachusetts has persisted in this view for many years.
North Carolina and New Hampshire have taken it in some cases. 3
All the other states seem to eschew it, save Kentucky, New York,
Rhode Island, and Virginia, 4 where statutes have changed the
common law to conform to the Massachusetts attitude. The other
common law states, in fact, seem diametrically opposed, for they
173 F. (2d) 970 (1934).
2 Sewall v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131; Amory v. Meredith, 7 Allen 397 (1863);
Howland v. Parker, 200 Mass. 204, 86 N. E. 287 (1908). Note 32 A. L. R. 1397,
and cases there cited.
3 Emery v. Haven, 67 N. H. 503, 35 A. 940 (1893); Johnston v. Knight, 117

N. C. 122, 23 S. E. 92 (1895).
4 Herbert's Guardian v. Herbert's Ex'r, 85 Ky. 134, 2 S. W. 682 (1887)
Greenway v. White, 196 Ky. 745, 246 S. W. 137, 32 A. L. R. 1385 (1922);
Hutton v. Benkard, 92 N. Y. 295 (1883) ; Speir v. Benvenuti, 197 App. Div.
209, 189 N. Y. S. 885 (1921) ; Cotting v. De Sartiges, 17 R. I. 668, 24 A. 530,
16 L. R. A. 367 (1892) ; Machir v. Funk, 90 Va. 284, 18 S. E. 197 (1893).
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hold that a residuary clause will never execute the power, unless
the intent to exercise it plainly appears in the will. 5
Illinois subscribes, in theory, to this "majority rule," 0 but in
practice the courts are alert to detect in the will the "plain7
intent" to exercise the power. In the case of Funk v. Eggleston,
Mrs. Funk, the testatrix, had received by her husband's will a
life interest in two-thirds of his estate, with the power to dispose
of the reversion. After holding that she took only a life estate
coupled with a power, and not the fee, the court decided that
Mrs. Funk's will executed her power of appointment. Apart
from the residuary clause itself, the only fact tending to show
that she purposed to use her power and devise the reversion, was
her specific bequest of a gold watch, which was a part of the
estate her husband had given her for life.
The Illinois court reviewed many early English decisions following Sir Edward Clere's Case,s and noticed the rule announced
in some of them 9 that there could be no execution of a power by
a testator unless the case fell in one of three classes: first, where
the will made explicit reference to the power; second, where it
referred specifically to the subject or property covered by the
power; or third, where the instrument would have been wholly
inoperative without the aid of the power. It characterized this
rule as "artificial and based upon past experience" only, while
it regarded the rule that the general intention should control
as one that is "based upon principle, and is substantial."
The court quoted with approval the reasonable language of Mr.
Justice Story in the case of Blagge v. Miles,' ° in which Massachusetts law governed: "The main point is to arrive at the
intention and object of the donee of the power ....
If the donee
of the power intends to execute, and the mode be in other respects unexceptionable, that intention, however manifested,
whether directly or indirectly, positively or by just implication,
will make the execution valid and operative."
5 Hollister v. Shaw, 46 Conn. 24B (1878); Patterson v. Wilson, 64 Md. 193,
1 A. 68 (1885) ; Farnum v. Pennsylvania Co., 87 N. J. Eq. 108, 99 A. 145,
affirmed, 87 N. J. Eq. 652, 101 A. 1053 (1916); Bilderback v. Boyce, 14 S. C.
528 (1880); Arnold v. Southern Pine Lumber Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 186,
123 S. W. 1162 (1909) ; Albert M. Kales, Estates, Future Interests, and Illegal
Conditions and Restraints in Illinois (2d ed., Chicago: Callaghan & Co.,
1920), sec. 640.
6 Hawthorn v. Ulrich, 207 Ill. 430, 69 N. E. 885 (1904); Griffin v. Griffin,
141 Ill. 373, 31 N. E. 131 (1892) ; Kales on Future Interests, sec. 641.
7 92 I1. 515 (1879).
8 6 Coke, 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (1599).
9 Jones v. Tucker, 2 Mer. 533, 35 Eng. Rep. 1044 (1817) ; Nannock v. Horton,
7 Ves. Jr. 398, 32 Eng. Rep. 158 (1802); Davies v. Thorne, 2 DeGex. & Sm.
347, 64 Eng. Rep. 510 (1849).
10 1 Story 426, 4 Law Rep. 256, 3 Fed. Cas. 559 (1841).
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The later Illinois case of Harvard College v. Balch" has been
cited 12 as strong authority in support of the narrow application
of the majority rule. There the power was created by a will of
J. M. Moriarty which gave his estate to J. 0. Rutter as trustee
for the use of Charles Lowell Hancock for his life, and at his
decease to such person or persons as Hancock in writing might
direct. But Hancock had made a will before Moriarty's was probated, and there was no evidence whatever in this suit that Hancock-even knew of the existence of his power. The court decided
against the execution of the power and used some language which
indicated its assent to the majority doctrine. But it should be
noticed that the decision can be supported upon the ground of
intention alone, in view of the circumstances. The case is certainly not authority for the proposition that the power or its
subject must be designated.
Patently, all courts will recognize the intention in some instances; for example, where the will "recites that it is made
pursuant to the power"13 or with the purpose of exercising it.
Illinois, in scrutinizing the will for any fact to aid the general
residuary clause in displaying an intention to exercise the power,
has done this much several times. 14 But it seems that Illinois has
gone far beyond the confining circumstance of a clearly expressed intention and has proceeded some distance toward the
generous Massachusetts attitude.
C. E. Fox
11 171 Ill. 275 (1898).
Kales on Future Interests, secs. 641, 642.
13 Kales on Future Interests, sec. 642.
12

14 Butler v. Huestis, 68 Il. 594 (1873); Wimberly v. Hurst, 33 Ill. 173
(1863).

